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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
The State conceded that the district court did not discuss a full half of the required test for
evaluating Mr. Tubbs’ request to present late-disclosed evidence during his trial. Under State v.
Lamphere, 130 Idaho 630, 634 (1997), and State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847 (1999), neither of
which the State discusses in any depth, that concession should be the end of the analysis since
both those cases hold the failure to conduct that analysis, in and of itself, demonstrates the
district court did not act consistent with the applicable legal standards.
Nevertheless, the State seeks to avoid the consequences of its concession by raising an
entirely new argument for the first time on appeal. Besides not being preserved for appeal, that
argument is contrary to both the controlling precedent and the record in this case. Its cursory
argument on the preserved theory is similarly flawed. For any and all these reasons, this Court
should reject the State’s arguments and remand this case for a new trial where Mr. Tubbs’ right
to present his defense is protected.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Tubbs’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Whether the district court erred by refusing to allow Mr. Tubbs to call the two late-discovered
witnesses.

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred By Refusing To Allow Mr. Tubbs To Call The Two
Late-Discovered Witnesses

A.

Under Clear Idaho Supreme Court Precedent, The State’s Concession That The District
Court Did Not Discuss One Of The Prongs Of The Requisite Analysis Should Be
Dispositive
The State conceded that the district court did not explicitly discuss any potential

prejudice to the State when it denied Mr. Tubbs’ request to present testimony from two latedisclosed witnesses. (Resp. Br., p.7.) The applicable legal standards are clear: when evaluating
whether to allow late-disclosed defense witnesses, “the trial court must weigh the prejudice to the
State against the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” State v. Albert, 138 Idaho 284, 287 (Ct. App.
2002) (emphasis added); accord Harris, 132 Idaho at 846-47. The term “must” signifies a
required duty, not an optional point of evaluation. See, e.g., Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho 841, 848
(1995). As such, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly made it clear that the failure to
actually discuss the potential prejudice is, in and of itself, reversible error: “We hold that the
district court exceeded the proper bounds of its discretion by failing to analyze whether the State
would suffer prejudice due to the late disclosure.”1 Lamphere, 130 Idaho at 634. Likewise:
“The trial court abused its discretion in excluding the witness by not evaluating the prejudice to
the State against Harris’ right to a fair trial.” Harris, 132 Idaho at 847.
1

When Lamphere was decided, the second prong of the test for abuse of discretion asked
whether the decision was within the bounds of the court’s discretion and was consistent with the
applicable legal standards. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018). The
Idaho Supreme Court has since separated those two analyses into two separate prongs under the
abuse of discretion standard. Lunneborg, 163 Idaho at 863-64. However, the Supreme Court has
also held that the failure to conduct the required analysis means the district court was not acting
consistent with the applicable standards. State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 762 (2015),
abrogated on other grounds. As such, regardless of when prong the analysis falls under, the
district court’s failure to conduct the required analysis is still an abuse of its discretion for the
reasons set forth in Lamphere and Orellana-Castro.
3

The decision in Harris is particularly telling in this regard because, in reaching that
conclusion, it expressly distinguished the decision in State v. Stradley. Harris, 132 Idaho at 846
(discussing State v. Stradley, 127 Idaho 203, 211-12 (1995)). In Stradley, the district court had
expressly weighed the actually-claimed prejudice to the State against the defendant’s rights.
Harris, 132 Idaho at 846.

By contrast, the district court in Harris only talked about the

discovery rules, simply excluding the witness as a discovery violation without mentioning any
potential prejudice to the State. Id. at 845. Thus, Harris’ distinguishing of Stradley makes it
clear that, when, as in Mr. Tubbs’ case, the district court only mentions the lack of notice and
does not expressly articulate the potential prejudice to the State, it has abused its discretion by
not conducting the required analysis. Id. at 847.
The State offers no argument suggesting that Harris and Lamphere should not control the
analysis in this regard. (See generally Resp. Br.) Rather, it primarily relies on State v. Thomas,
133 Idaho 800 (Ct. App. 1999), in trying to justify the district court’s decision despite its
concession. (See Resp. Br., pp.9-11.) In Thomas, as in Stradley, the district court actually
recognized the proper factors it was to consider and affirmatively conducted the requisite
analysis, concluding: “the defense’s sudden change of position had ‘put the State in a bind’
concerning rebuttal witnesses and that there was ‘enough prejudice to the State to deny the
motion to reopen to allow [the witness] to testify here.’” Thomas, 133 Idaho at 802 & 803. In
other words, the Court of Appeals explained: “The district court considered the arguments by
both parties, performed the requisite balancing test, and concluded that the prejudice to the State
outweighed any effect on Thomas’ right to a fair trial. Thomas has not shown that this ruling
was an abuse of discretion.” Id. As such, the State’s reliance on Thomas is misplaced for the
same reasons Harris distinguished Stradley.
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As such, under Harris and Lamphere, the State’s concession – that the district court did
not explicitly analyze whether the State would suffer prejudice by allowing the late-discovered
witnesses to testify – is dispositive in this appeal. As such, this Court should grant relief because
that conceded failure to conduct the proper analysis, in and of itself, shows the abuse of the
district court’s discretion.

B.

The State’s Attempts To Avoid The Result Dictated By Its Concession Are All Contrary
To The Applicable Precedent And The Record

1.

The State’s primary argument on the merits was not raised below, and so, is not
preserved for appeal

The Idaho Supreme Court has recently and repeatedly made clear that, on appeal, the
State cannot argue a theory on an issue which the prosecutor did not argue below. See, e.g.,
State v. Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, 343 (2019); State v. Garcia-Rodriguez, 162 Idaho 271, 275-76
(2017); accord State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 95, 99 (2019). Below, the prosecutor did not make
any argument that Mr. Tubbs’ offer of proof was unclear, vague, or otherwise insufficient to
demonstrate that the proffered testimony was relevant, and thus, implicated his right to present a
defense. (See generally Tr., pp.14-20.) Rather, the only theory the prosecutor argued below was
that the defense should not be allowed to call the late-discovered witnesses because it did not
comply with the discovery deadlines set forth in I.C.R. 16. (Tr., p.14, L.21 - p.15, L.19; see
generally Tr., pp.14-20.)
And yet, on appeal, the State all but abandoned the preserved argument, dedicating one
cursory paragraph to that theory.

(See Resp. Br., p.11; see generally Resp. Br., pp.7-11.)

Instead, it began backing a new theory, a new horse, on appeal, contending Mr. Tubbs’ offer of
proof with respect to the late-disclosed witnesses was insufficiently vague to justify allowing the
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witnesses to testify. (See Resp. Br., pp.7-11.) Since that is a new theory raised for the first time
on appeal, this Court should refuse to consider it.

2.

Lamphere, not Thomas, governs the analysis on the merits of the State’s new
theory on appeal, and Lamphere contradicts the State’s new theory

Even if this Court considers the merits State’s new argument on appeal, it should still
reject it because it is unfounded. That is because State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 800 (Ct. App.
1999), upon which the State’s argument is based (see Resp. Br., pp.7-11), is distinguishable from
Mr. Tubbs’ case in two critical respects. Rather, this case is far more similar to Lamphere, and
under Lamphere, Mr. Tubbs’ offer of proof was sufficient to show the proffered testimony was
relevant.
The first critical distinction between this case and Thomas is that, it was only after the
defense had actually rested its case-in-chief that defense counsel decided he wanted to call the
witness in question. Thomas, 133 Idaho at 802. In fact, prior to the trial, the defense attorney
affirmatively told the prosecutor that he would not be calling the witness in question. Id. That is
important because the analysis changes when a party is trying to reopen his case-in-chief: See,
e.g., Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 481-82 (1973). Specifically, the party seeking to reopen has
to show some “reasonable excuse such as oversight, inability to produce or ignorance of the
existence of the evidence must be established by the moving party.” Id. As such, additional
specificity was needed in the offer of proof in Thomas to establish the reasonable excuse for not
calling the known witness during the defense’s case-in-chief, since only by establishing such an
excuse could he ultimately show that not allowing him to call that witness, who he had known
about and had access to prior to trial, would violate his right to a fair trial. See Thomas, 133
Idaho at 802.
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Mr. Tubbs’ case is vastly different in that regard because he disclosed his intent to call
these witnesses before the trial started. Prior even to his initial witness disclosure, defense
counsel notified the prosecutor that he was working to track down Mr. Tubbs’ prior co-workers
as potential witnesses. (Tr., p.16, Ls.7-12.) Then, on the Friday before trial, when defense
counsel actually did secure those witnesses, he filed a notice to inform the prosecutor that he did,
indeed, intended to call them. (R., pp.92-93.) As a result of those fact, Mr. Tubbs’ case is much
more similar to Lamphere than Thomas in this regard.
In Lamphere, a search incident to arrest uncovered a vial with some residue on the
defendant’s person. Lamphere, 130 Idaho at 631. He told the officers his girlfriend had given
him the vial after finding it in her daughter’s room, and he thought it might have been used to
hold drugs. Id. Five days before trial, the defense disclosed that they wanted to call the
daughter, and the offer of proof was simply that she “could identify the vial as belonging to one
of her friends.” Id. The Supreme Court held that offer of proof was sufficient to show the
daughter’s testimony “was relevant to the issue of knowledge of what the substance was, an
element of the offense of possession of a controlled substance.” Id. at 633. After all, as the
Idaho Supreme Court recently explained, the threshold for relevance is low – it need only tend to
make a fact of consequence within the overall analysis more or less likely. State v. Garcia, 166
Idaho 661, ___, 462 P.3d 1125, 1134-35 (2020). As such, the Lamphere Court held it was
reversible error for the district court to have excluded that relevant testimony without actually
considering any prejudice to the State. Lamphere, 130 Idaho at 633-34.
Like the defense in Lamphere, Mr. Tubbs’ offer of proof revealed that the late-discovered
witnesses would contradict some of H.T.’s allegations, and thus, bolster the defense’s version of
events. (Tr., p.18, L.22 - p.19, L.8; Tr., p.20, Ls.7-10.) As such, as in Lamphere, his offer of
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proof was sufficient to show the proffered testimony was relevant, and thus, that its exclusion
impacted on his right to present a defense.
The second major difference between Mr. Tubbs’ case and Thomas is that, in Thomas,
the general assertions of relevance in the witness’s testimony were actually disproved by the
record. Specifically, the attorney in Thomas generally asserted that the witness in question could
refute some of the victim’s allegations about the alleged incident. Thomas, 133 Idaho at 802.
The Court of Appeals rejected that argument because the witness “was not present during the
[alleged incident] and thus could offer no first-hand knowledge of those events.” Id. at 803.
Rather, the witness’s testimony was only based on after-the-fact discussions with the alleged
victim. Id.; see id. at 802. Moreover, there was no clear indication was to what those after-thefact discussions included. See id. at 802-03. As such, “the facts to which [the late-disclosed
witness] would testify were not described” with sufficient specificity as to demonstrate the
defendant’s right to a fair trial had been compromised. Id. at 803 (emphasis from original).
The State’s argument in this case improperly focuses on just the Thomas Court’s
discussion of the lack of specificity in the offer of proof without acknowledging the critical
context in which that analysis occurred – the witness’s lack of first-hand knowledge of the events
to which defense counsel wanted her to testify.

(See Resp. Br., pp.7-11.) With that full

understanding of the context of Thomas’ analysis, that analysis is readily distinguishable in
Mr. Tubbs’ case.
Here, unlike in Thomas, defense counsel provided information about the specific facts to
which the late-discovered witnesses would testify based on their personal observations, and how
those facts would directly refute allegations in H.T.’s testimony. For example, one of H.T.’s
allegations was that some of the abuse occurred at home during “school hours.” (Tr., p.19, Ls.1-
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4.) Defense counsel explained that the late-disclosed witnesses would testify from their personal
knowledge that Mr. Tubbs did not take time off. (Tr., p.20, L.7-10.) That tends to make H.T.’s
allegations in that regard less likely to be true, and therefore, satisfies the low threshold for
relevance. See Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1134-35; compare Lamphere, 130 Idaho at 633. In fact, as
the Supreme Court explained in Harris, relevant testimony was improperly excluded because it
would have contradicted the alleged victim’s account of the events at issue, and thus, that her
allegations were less likely to be true. Harris, 132 Idaho at 847. Thus, the offer of proof in
Mr. Tubbs’ case contained precisely the sort of specific facts that was missing in Thomas, and
thus, Thomas is not applicable to his case.
As such, even if this Court considers the merits of the State’s new argument on appeal, it
should reject that argument because Thomas is wholly distinguishable. Rather, like in Lamphere
and Harris, Mr. Tubbs’ offer of proof was sufficient to show the late-discovered witnesses’
testimony would have been relevant, and thus, that the refusal to allow them to testify infringed
on his constitutional right to present a defense.

3.

The State’s cursory contention on the only preserved argument on the merits is
contrary to Harris and disproved by the record

As noted supra, the State dedicates only one paragraph to arguing the theory the
prosecutor made below. (Resp. Br., p.11.) However, its cursory argument in that regard – that
the prejudice caused by the lateness of the disclosure was so obvious that this Court should infer
the district court implicitly considered it –is contrary to the relevant precedent and disproved by
the record. In fact, the State did not actually cite any authority in support of that cursory
argument. (See Resp. Br., p.11.) Of course, the failure to cite authority in support of an
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argument means the party waives that particular issue. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263
(1996). As such, this Court should refuse to consider the State’s insufficient, cursory argument.
The State’s failure to cite authority in support is actually unsurprising since the applicable
Idaho Supreme Court precedent runs directly contrary to the State’s position. See Harris, 132
Idaho at 846-47. The type of prejudice which the district court considered in Stradley is the
same type of prejudice the State contends is implicitly evident in this case – that, due to the late
disclosure, the State was unprepared to rebut the defense witness’s testimony. Stradley, 127
Idaho at 210-11. That same type of presence was also implicitly present in Harris, where the
district court excluded the witness as a discovery sanction based on the lateness of the disclosure.
Harris, 132 Idaho at 845. Nevertheless, the Harris Court found reversible error in that case after
expressly distinguishing Stradley. Id. at 846-47. As such, the Supreme Court was effectively
holding that it is not proper to uphold the exclusion of such a witness based on the implicit
presence of this type of potential prejudice. See Harris, 132 Idaho at 846-47. Thus, this Court
should reject the State’s argument because it runs directly contrary to Harris.
Moreover, the record in this case actually shows the district court negated that alleged
implicit prejudice to the State. Specifically, the district court ordered Mr. Tubbs to make the
late-discovered witnesses available to the prosecutor so that the prosecutor could interview them.
(Tr., p.19, Ls.15-18, p.20, Ls.18-19.) The reason the district court did that was so the prosecutor
could prepare to address their testimony in the potential scenario their testimony became
necessary. (Tr., p.19, Ls.15-18, p.20, Ls.18-19.) Since the prosecutor was assured of time to
prepare to deal with those witnesses’ testimony, there could be no meaningful prejudice to the
State based simply on the lateness of the disclosure.
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The Idaho Supreme Court considered a similar situation in Harris, and it indicated why
there would not be any meaningful prejudice in that scenario. Harris, 132 Idaho at 847. In
Harris, the defendant inadvertently left a witness off his witness list. Id. at 845. The district
court excluded that witness as a discovery violation, but it noted it would be willing to reconsider
that decision if the prosecutor had a chance to interview the witness before the witness was
ultimately called to testify. Harris, 132 Idaho at 845. The defense made the witness available,
but the prosecutor chose not to interview the witness. Id.
The Supreme Court held the district court’s error in not conducting the required prejudice
analysis “was compounded by the fact that the trial court placed the determination of whether the
State could interview and respond to the testimony within the discretion of the prosecution.” Id.
at 847. Essentially, the Supreme Court was saying it was improper to give the prosecutor the
option to allow this sort of prejudice to fester by refusing to interview the newly-disclosed
witness when he had the ability to avoid the continuing impact of that prejudice, even when the
witness was disclosed in the middle of the trial. See id. This is because, on the other side of the
scale is the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense, which should be protected
where possible. Stradley, 127 Idaho at 211 (“Particularly in a serious felony case such as this,
the trial court is called upon to fashion a sanction which will impress counsel with the
importance of responding to discovery requests, and yet will not prejudice the defense of the
case.”)
In Mr. Tubbs’ case, the district court did what the district court failed to do in Harris –
instruct the prosecutor to interview Mr. Tubbs’ witnesses to protect against the possibility their
testimony would ultimately become necessary. In doing so, the district court actually minimized
any potential implicit prejudice due to the lateness of Mr. Tubbs’ disclosure because it gave the
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prosecutor time (in addition to the time he already had based on defense counsel’s pretrial
disclosures) to prepare for their testimony. As such, the record affirmatively contradicts the
State’s bare assertion that there was prejudice implicit in the record. Therefore, this Court
should reject the State’s only cursory argument on the preserved theory.

C.

The State Has Failed To Prove This Error Was Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
As the Idaho Supreme Court recently reaffirmed, the State has the burden to prove a

preserved error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138-39. The Court
made it clear that the harmless error test is a two-pronged analysis which “requires weighing the
probative force of the record as a whole while excluding the erroneous evidence and at the same
time comparing it against the probative force of the error.” Id. at 1138. As such, it is not
sufficient to simply say the other evidence presented would have been sufficient to support a
finding of guilt; the harmless error standard requires the State to prove there is no reasonable
possibility the error itself did not have an impact on the jury’s resolution of the case within the
context of the overall case. Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138-39.
The State’s argument for harmlessness essentially reiterates its new argument on appeal
about the relevance of the witnesses’ testimony. Since, as discussed supra, the late-discovered
witnesses’ testimony was relevant, the State’s argument for harmlessness on that basis fails. As
the Idaho Supreme Court has held in this same situation, where “[t]he evidence that was
excluded went directly to the credibility of [the alleged victim], both as to her recollection of the
events and the feasibility of the alleged [offense] as she described it,” the error in excluding that
evidence was not harmless. Harris, 132 Idaho at 848. That is precisely what the late-discovered
witnesses’ testimony would have done in Mr. Tubbs’ case – contradicted the feasibility of the
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alleged offense as H.T. described it. Therefore, the erroneous exclusion of those witnesses was
not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
The State’s harmlessness argument is also contrary to Harris in a second respect.
Specifically, the State contends that, since the late-discovered witnesses could only testify with
respect to the allegations about abuses at Mr. Tubbs’ place of business, any error in excluding
them was harmless because H.T. also described instances of abuse outside his workplace. (See
Resp. Br., pp.8-9 (arguing that H.T.’s allegations about the abuse outside normal business hours
“provid[ed] yet more opportunity for the abuse to occur, notwithstanding the observations of any
of Tubbs’ former coworkers”).)

However, the Harris Court rejected essentially the same

analysis. Harris, 132 Idaho at 848.
In Harris, the defendant was charged with kidnapping and raping the alleged victim. Id.
at 845.

The excluded witness in that case would have contradicted the alleged victim’s

testimony only with respect to the kidnapping charge. Id. at 845 & 848. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court held the error in excluding that witness was not harmless with respect to the rape
charge because, “[i]f the jurors questioned [the alleged victim’s] testimony that she was
kidnapped, they might also have questioned her testimony that she was raped.” Id. at 848.
The same is true in Mr. Tubbs’ case – if the jurors questioned H.T.’s testimony with
respect to the workplace allegations, they might also have questioned her testimony about the
other instances of misconduct. After all, the defense theory was that she had fabricated all the
allegations to avoid the family reunification process that was occurring. (Tr., p.382, L.1 – p.383,
L.21.) As such, the State failed to show that the erroneous exclusion of the late-discovered
witnesses had no probative value within the overall context of this case, and so, failed to carry its
burden to prove this error harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Tubbs respectfully requests this Court reverse the order preventing Mr. Tubbs from
calling his late-discovered witnesses in his defense and remand this case for a new trial.
DATED this 15th day of April, 2021.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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